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Abstract
Sequential majority voting over interconnected binary propositions can lead to the
overruling of unanimous consensus. We characterize, within the general framework
of judgement aggregation, under what circumstances this happens for some sequence
of the voting process. It turns out that the class of aggregation spaces for which this
difficulty arises is very large, including the aggregation of preference orderings over
at least four alternatives, the aggregation of equivalence relations over at least four
objects, resource allocation problems, and most committee selection problems.
We also ask whether it is possible to design respect for unanimity by choosing
appropriate decision sequences. Remarkably, while this is not possible in general, it
can be accomplished in interesting special cases. Adapting and generalizing a classic
result by Shepsle and Weingast, we show that respect for unanimity can indeed be
thus guaranteed in case of the aggregation of weak orderings, strict orderings and
equivalence relations.
A well-known problem from the theory of preference aggregation is that sequential pair-
wise majority voting can yield Pareto-dominated alternatives, provided that there are at
least four alternatives (Moulin, 1988, p.242). Within the general framework of judgement
aggregation this is an instance of the fact that sequential majority voting over intercon-
nected propositions can lead to the situation that a previous majority decision forces the
rejection of a proposition that is unanimously accepted (see Section 1.5 below for exam-
ples).
In this paper, we characterize the aggregation spaces on which sequential majority vot-
ing always respects unanimous consent, no matter in which sequence the majority decisions
are taken and no matter what the individual judgements are. We shall call such spaces
robustly unanimity consistent. It turns out that the robustly unanimity consistent spaces
represent a simple and natural generalization of the median spaces which play a distin-
guished role in the theory of aggregation (see Barthe´le´my and Monjardet (1981), Nehring
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and Puppe (2002, 2007)). Median spaces are characterized by the condition that the un-
derlying feasibility restrictions among propositions can be described in terms of ‘simple’
implications each having exactly one proposition as its antecedent. By contrast, the ro-
bustly unanimity consistent spaces are characterized by the condition that the underlying
feasibility restrictions among propositions are confined to implications in which the an-
tecedent consists of the conjunction of at most two propositions. Evidently, this is still
a rather special case; the result thus shows that potential unanimity violations are quite
common in judgement aggregation.
While in most spaces violations of unanimity can occur for some sequence of majority
decisions (given some profile of individual judgements), a weaker requirement is that they
do not occur for all sequences. The underlying idea is that one can perhaps prevent una-
nimity violations to occur by an appropriate design of the decision path, i.e. by a suitable
restriction on the set of admissible (sequential) agendas. Accordingly, we shall say that an
aggregation space is designably unanimity consistent if there exists a sequence such that
unanimous decisions are always respected provided that the majority decisions are taken
in the prespecified order. It turns out that many spaces are not even designably unanimity
consistent. However, there are interesting classes of aggregation problems that do have
this property. Here, we prove that the spaces of all strict orderings, all weak orderings,
and all equivalence relations on any finite set of alternatives are designably consistent,
respectively. Our analysis generalizes classic results of Shepsle and Weingast (1984); in
particular, we define an appropriate generalization of the ‘covering relation’ corresponding
to a majority tournament, and show that it always respects unanimous decisions. We then
construct a decision sequence such that the resulting transitive binary relation extends the
covering relation, which yields the desired conclusion. While a full characterization of the
class of all aggregation problems that are designably unanimity consistent appears to be
difficult, we are able to derive a relatively simple necessary condition, which requires that
certain ‘exposed’ feasibility restrictions have limited reach.
The agenda setting problem is a classic topic in political science, see e.g. Miller (1995).
For previous considerations of sequential majority voting in judgement aggregation, see
List (2004) and Dietrich and List (2007). The present paper complements the analysis
of Nehring et al. (2013) where we analyze sequential majority voting in terms of the en-
tailed extent of indeterminacy, following the classical approach of McKelvey (1979). Here,
we concentrate on assessing the qualitative ‘severity’ of the path-dependence of sequential
majority voting, as embodied by the violation of unanimous judgements. The widespread
tension between unanimity on the one hand and ‘premise-based’ majoritarian and superma-
joritarian voting rules on the other has been studied in the special case of truth-functional
judgement aggregation problems in Nehring (2005).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the judgement aggregation
model along with our terminology and notation. We also present some basic examples of
aggregation spaces corresponding to preference aggregation, the aggregation of equivalence
relations, the aggregation of general binary relations, committee selection and resource
allocation, respectively. In Section 2, we characterize when sequential majority voting can
override a unanimous consensus of voters on some issues for some sequence of the voting
process, i.e. the class of robustly unanimity consistent spaces. In Section 3, we consider the
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weaker condition that unanimous consensus be respected for some appropriate sequence
of the voting process, i.e. designable unanimity consistency, and give positive as well as
negative examples. For ease of reading, some technically more involved proofs are relegated
to an appendix at the end of the paper.
1 Sequential majority voting and the Condorcet set
1.1 The judgement aggregation model
Let K ∈ N, and let [1...K] index a set of propositions or issues. An element x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xK) ∈ {0, 1}K is called a view, and interpreted as an assignment of a truth
value of ‘true’ or ‘false’ to each proposition.1 Not all views are feasible, because there
will be logical constraints between the propositions (determined by the structure of the
underlying decision problem faced by society). Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K be the set of ‘admissible’
or consistent views; a given set X ⊆ {0, 1}K is also referred to as an aggregation space. An
anonymous profile is a probability measure on X —that is, a function µ : X−→[0, 1] such
that
∑
x∈X µ(x) = 1 with the interpretation that, for all x ∈ X, µ(x) is the proportion of
the voters who hold the view x. For any Y ⊆ X, define µ(Y ) := ∑y∈Y µ(y). Let ∆(X)
be the set of all anonymous profiles. For any µ ∈ ∆(X), any k ∈ [1...K], let
µk(1) := µ{x ∈ X ; xk = 1} (1)
be the total ‘popular support’ for the position “xk = 1,” and let µk(0) := 1 − µk(1).
Let ∆∗ (X) := {µ ∈ ∆(X); µk(1) 6= 12 , ∀k ∈ [1...K]} be the set of anonymous profiles
where there is a strict majority supporting either 0 or 1 in each coordinate. For expository
convenience, we will confine our analysis to profiles in ∆∗ (X).2 For every profile µ, we
denote by Maj(µ) ∈ {0, 1}K the issuewise majority view, i.e. for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), Majk(µ) :=
1 if µk(1) >
1
2
, and Majk(µ) := 0 if µk(1) <
1
2
.
1.2 The Condorcet set
In general, one has Maj(µ) 6∈ X —the ‘majority ideal’ can be inconsistent with the under-
lying logical constraints faced by society.3 However, a basic principle of majoritarianism is
that we should try to satisfy the majority’s will in as many issues as possible. In Nehring
et al. (2013), we have thus proposed the notion of the Condorcet set Cond (X,µ) ⊆ X as
the set of all views x ∈ X such that no y ∈ X agrees with Maj(µ) on a strictly larger
set of issues than x. The elements of Cond (X,µ) are also referred to as the Condorcet
admissible views. A profile µ is called majority determinate if Cond (X,µ) is single-valued;
1The literature on judgement aggregation uses various models and terms, see List and Puppe (2009)
for an overview. Here, we adopt the terminology of Nehring et al. (2013).
2Note that if the set of voters is large (resp. odd), then a profile in ∆(X) \ ∆∗ (X) is highly unlikely
(resp. impossible).
3Condorcet’s ‘voting paradox’ is a well-known instance; another example that has received considerable
interest recently is the so-called ‘discursive dilemma,’ see Kornhauser and Sager (1986), List and Pettit
(2002).
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in this case, Cond (X,µ) = {Maj(µ)} (see Nehring et al. (2013)). A space X is called
majority determinate if all profiles µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) are majority determinate.
1.3 Sequential majority voting
For any y = (yk)
K
k=1 ∈ {0, 1}K and J ⊂ [1...K], define yJ := (yj)j∈J ∈ {0, 1}J . Fur-
thermore, for any i ∈ [1...K] \ J , say that yi is X-consistent with yJ if there exists some
x ∈ X with xJ = yJ and xi = yi —otherwise yi is X-inconsistent with yJ . A path
through [1...K] is a bijection γ : [1...K]−→[1...K]. We now define the γ-sequential majority
rule F γ : ∆∗ (X)−→X. Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and let z := Maj(µ). Define y := F γ(µ) ∈ X
inductively as follows:
• Define yγ(1) := zγ(1).
• Inductively, let J := {γ(1), γ(2), . . . , γ(n)}, and suppose we have already decided yJ .
Let i := γ(n + 1). If zi is X-consistent with yJ , then set yi := zi. Otherwise, set
yi = ¬zi.4
The following result, proven in Nehring et al. (2013), establishes a close connection between
sequential majority voting and the Condorcet set:
Proposition 1.1 (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe, 2012) Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K.
(a) For any path γ through [1...K], the rule F γ is Condorcet admissible.
(b) Conversely, for any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and x ∈ Cond (X,µ), there exists a path γ such
that F γ(µ) = x.
1.4 Majority determinacy and path-independence
A profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-independent if F γ(µ) = F ξ(µ) for any two paths γ and ξ
through [1...K]. The space X itself is called path-independent if every µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) is path-
independent.
Let J ⊆ [1...K] and consider w ∈ {0, 1}J which corresponds to a subset of judgements
on the issues in J . The set J is the support of w, denoted supp (w). We define |w| := |J |.
If I ⊆ J and v ∈ {0, 1}I , then we say v is a fragment of w (and write v v w) if v = wI .
Furthermore, w is a forbidden fragment for X if, for all x ∈ X, we have xJ 6= w where
J = supp (w). Finally, w is a critical fragment if it is a minimal forbidden fragment —that
is, w is forbidden, and there exists no proper subfragment v < w such that v is forbidden.5
Let C(X) be the set of critical fragments for X, and let κ(X) := max {|c| ; c ∈ C(X)}.
A particular role is played by spaces X ⊆ {0, 1}K for which κ(X) = 2; these are
known as median spaces in combinatorial mathematics. Their importance in the theory
of aggregation has been emphasized by (Barthe´le´my and Monjardet, 1981; Nehring and
4“¬” represents logical negation. That is: ¬1 := 0 and ¬0 := 1.
5Critical fragments are called ‘critical families’ in Nehring and Puppe (2007, 2010) and ‘minimal infea-
sible partial evaluations (MIPEs)’ in Dokow and Holzman (2010).
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Puppe, 2007, 2010). Note that a set of feasible views X is a median space if and only if
all logical interrelations are confined to simple implications: for some j, k and all x ∈ X,
xj = 0 implies that xk = 0, or xj = 0 implies that xk = 1. We have the following
fundamental result (cf. (Nehring et al., 2013, Prop. 1.4), (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Fact
3.4)).
Proposition 1.2 (Nehring and Puppe, 2007; Nehring, Pivato and Puppe, 2012)
Let X ⊆ {0, 1}K. The following are equivalent: [i] X is path-independent; [ii] X is
majority determinate; [iii] X is a median space, i.e. κ(X) = 2.
1.5 Examples
1.5.1 Aggregation of strict preference orderings
Let N ∈ N, let A := [1...N ] be some set of N social alternatives, let K := N(N − 1)/2,
and bijectively identify [1...K] with a subset of A×A which contains exactly one element
of the set {(a, b), (b, a)} for each distinct a, b ∈ A. Then {0, 1}K represents the space of
all tournaments (i.e. complete, antisymmetric binary relations, or equivalently, complete
directed graphs) on A. Let XprN ⊂ {0, 1}K be the set of all tournaments representing
total orderings (i.e. permutations) of A (sometimes called the permutahedron). Classical
Arrovian aggregation of strict preference orderings is simply judgement aggregation on XprN .
For any profile µ ∈ ∆∗(XprN ), Maj(µ) is the majority tournament corresponding to µ. We
will write a
µ b if the majority strictly prefers a to b, i.e. if Maj(µ) entails a ‘yes’ on issue
(a, b). By definition, the Condorcet set Cond (XprN , µ) is the set of preference orderings on
A such that no other ordering agrees with Maj(µ) (resp.
µ) on a larger set of pairwise
comparisons.
As an illustrative example, consider the 4-permutahedron with alternatives a, b, c, d.
Suppose that one third of the population endorses each of the preference orderings a 
b  c  d, b  c  d  a and c  d  a  b. For the corresponding majority tournament
we have c
µ a, d µ a, a µ b, b µ c, b µ d, and c µ d (see Figure 1). The Condorect set
is easily shown to consist of the following five orderings: a  b  c  d, b  c  d  a,
c  d  a  b, d  a  b  c, c  a  b  d.
b d
a
c
 
  	
6
-
@
@@R  
  
@
@@I
Figure 1: A majority tournament on four alternatives
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1.5.2 Aggregation of equivalence relations
Let N ∈ N, A := [1...N ], K := N(N − 1)/2, and identify [1...K] with a subset of A × A
containing exactly one of the pairs (a, b) or (b, a) for each a 6= b ∈ A. Thus, an element
of {0, 1}K represents a symmetric, reflexive binary relation (i.e. undirected graph) on A.
Denote by XeqN ⊂ {0, 1}K be the set of all equivalence relations on A = [1...N ]. Also
in this case, one typically finds that the issue-wise majority view does not respect the
underlying feasibility constraints, i.e. typically Maj(µ) 6∈ XeqN . Consider, for instance, on
the set A = {a, b, c, d} the three equivalence relations corresponding to the partitions
{{a, b, c}, {d}}, {{a}, {b, c, d}}, and {{a, b}, {c, d}}, respectively. If each of these three
equivalence relations receives the support of 1/3 of the population, the corresponding
issue-wise majority relation is evidently not transitive; e.g. either pair (a, b) and (b, c) is
considered equivalent by a majority, while a and c are considered not equivalent by a
majority.
1.5.3 Committee selection
For any x ∈ {0, 1}K , let ‖x‖ := #{k ∈ [1...K] ; xk = 1}. Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and define
XcomI,J ;K :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}K ; I ≤ ‖x‖ ≤ J}. (2)
Heuristically, [1...K] is a set of K ‘candidates,’ and XcomI,J ;K is the set of all ‘committees’
comprised of at least I and at most J of these candidates. In the context of the committee
selection problem, the Condorcet set can be described as follows (see Nehring et al. (2013)).
For µ ∈ ∆∗(XcomI,J ;K), let M := {k ∈ [1...K]; µk(1) > 12} denote the set of all candidates
receiving majority support. If I ≤ |M | ≤ J , then the Condorcet set corresponding to
µ consists of the single committee containing exactly the candidates in M ; if |M | < I,
then the Condorcet set consists of all committees of size I that contain all members of M ;
and if |M | > J , then the Condorcet set consists of all committees that contain exactly J
members of M .
1.5.4 Resource allocation
Fix M,D ∈ N, and consider the D-dimensional ‘discrete cube’ [0...M ]D. Then each element
x ∈ [1...M ]D can be represented by a point Φ(x) := x˜ ∈ {0, 1}D×M defined as follows:
for all (d,m) ∈ [1...D]× [1...M ], x˜(d,m) :=
{
1 if xd ≥ m;
0 if xd < m.
(3)
This defines an injection Φ : [0...M ]D−→{0, 1}D×M , and any subset of P ⊂ [0...M ]D can
thereby be represented as a subset X := Φ(P ) ⊂ {0, 1}D×M . Judgement aggregation over
X thus represents social choice over a D-dimensional ‘policy space’, where each voter’s
position represents her ideal point in P , the set of feasible policies. This framework is
especially useful for resource allocation problems, as we now illustrate. Let
4DM :=
{
x ∈ [0...M ]D ;
D∑
d=1
xd = M
}
,
and X∆M,D := Φ[4DM ] ⊂ {0, 1}D×M .
(4)
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Geometrically, 4DM is a ‘discrete simplex’; points in 4DM represent all ways of allocating M
indivisible dollars amongst exactly D claimants. Thus, judgement aggregation over X∆M,D
describes a group which decides how to allocate a budget of M dollars towards D claimants
by voting ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ to propositions of the form ‘xd should be at least m dollars’ for
each d ∈ [1...D] and m ∈ [1...M ]; see Lindner et al. (2010).
On the space X∆M,D, the Condorcet set can be described as follows. For each d ∈ [1...D]
and µ, let m∗d := medd(µ) denote the median in coordinate d (that is: m
∗
d is the unique m ∈
[0 . . .M ] such that µ(xd,m) >
1
2
> µ(xd,m+1)}; this value exists because µ ∈ ∆∗(X∆M,D)).
It is easily shown that Maj(µ) = Φ(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
D). Let D(µ) :=
(∑D
d=1m
∗
d
)
−M be the
‘majority deficit’ corresponding to the profile µ. Note that the majority deficit can be
positive or negative.
IfD(µ) = 0, then (and only then) the Condorcet consists of the single allocation Maj(µ).
Moreover, if there is positive (negative) deficit, the Condorcet set arises by allocating at
most (at least) the median amount to each claimant while distributing the slack in any
feasible way. In the space X∆M,D, the size of the Condorcet set is thus directly determined
by the absolute value of the majority deficit |D(µ)|, which in effect thus measures the
‘degree of path-dependence.’
1.5.5 Aggregation of general binary relations
As above, consider N ∈ N and A := [1...N ]. Let K := N(N − 1) and identify [1...K]
with the subset of A × A that contains all pairs (a, b) with a 6= b. An element of {0, 1}K
can be identified with a reflexive binary relation on A.6 Note that a number of common
restrictions such as symmetry, asymmetry, or completeness, give rise to a median space
structure, since they can all be described in terms of logical implications relating exactly
two issues. In other words, each instance of one of these restrictions corresponds to critical
fragment of length 2. For instance, symmetry corresponds to the implications x(a,b) = 1⇒
x(b,a) = 1 for all a, b ∈ A, i.e. to the critical fragments of the form (1(a,b), 0(b,a)). Similarly,
asymmetry corresponds to the critical fragments of the form (1(a,b), 1(b,a)) for all a, b ∈ A,
and completeness to the critical fragments of the form (0(a,b), 0(b,a)) for all a, b ∈ A.
The space XprN defined in Section 1.5.1 above can thus be identified with the set of
all transitive binary relations that satisfy the completeness and asymmetry conditions for
all pairs a, b ∈ A; similarly, the space XeqN corresponds to the set of all transitive binary
relations that satisfy all symmetry conditions. Let Xw.o.N denote the set of all weak order-
ings on [1...N ], i.e. the set of all transitive binary relations that satisfy the completeness
conditions for all a, b ∈ A (but not necessarily asymmetry). Let Xp.o.N denote the set of all
partial orderings on [1...N ], i.e. the set of all transitive binary relations that satisfy the
asymmetry conditions for all a, b ∈ A (but not necessarily completeness).
For notational convenience, we will henceforth denote the statement x(a,b) = 1 (‘a stands
in relation to b’) also by aRb, and the statement x(a,b) = 0 (‘a does not stand in relation
6For simplicity, we omit the potential issues (a, a) for all a ∈ A, and assume reflexivity of the underlying
binary relations. All our results hold analogously for irreflexive binary relations, and they generalize in
a straightforward way to binary relations that are neither reflexive nor irreflexive by incorporating in
addition all issues of the form (a, a).
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to b’) by aRcb; moreover, let aPb :⇔ (aRb & bRca).
2 Robust unanimity consistency
Sequential majority voting, or equivalently: choosing from the Condorcet set in an un-
restricted manner, can lead to violations of unanimous consent in some issues. A simple
(and well-known) example is the following situation in the 4-permutahedron, cf. (Moulin,
1988, p.242).
Example 2.1 As in Section 1.5.1 above, suppose that µ(1) = µ(2) = µ(3) = 13 for
the three preference orderings a 1 b 1 c 1 d, b 2 c 2 d 2 a, c 3 d 3 a 3 b.
Let γ be any path that first decides the three binary comparisons (d, a), (a, b), (b, c). Then,
we obtain d
µ a, a µ b and b µ c, each with a (2/3) majority; thus, by transitivity,
the ordering d  a  b  c is selected by F γ(µ). In particular, d  c although there is
unanimous agreement on the opposite ranking of d and c. ♦
The following analysis will show that the unanimity violation displayed in Example
2.1 is due to the existence of a critical fragment of length ≥ 4. This explains, among
other things, the well-known fact that unanimity violations cannot occur in the context of
preference aggregation if there are only three alternatives.
For any µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and k ∈ [1...K], we say that µ is unanimous in coordinate k if
µk(0) = 1 or µk(1) = 1. Let x ∈ X; we say that x violates unanimity in issue k if µk(xk) = 0.
We say that X is robustly unanimity consistent if, for all µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) and all paths γ, F γ(µ)
does not violate unanimity in any issue. Note that the interest in a concept such as robust
unanimity consistency goes well beyond the sequential interpretation of majority voting, as
it rules out any potential conflict between majoritarianism and proposition-wise unanimity.
The following is this section’s main result; it is reminiscent of Proposition 1.2 (recall
that κ(X) is the size of the largest critical fragment in X).
Theorem 2.2 An aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1}K is robustly unanimity consistent if and
only if κ(X) ≤ 3.
Proof. To show the necessity of κ(X) ≤ 3, by contraposition, suppose that X admits
a critical fragment c of length ≥ 4. By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can write
c = (c1, c2, ..., cm) ∈ {0, 1}m with 4 ≤ m ≤ K. By the criticality of c, we can find three
elements x1,x2,x3 ∈ X such that7
x1 = (¬c1, c2, c3, c4, ..., cm, ...),
x2 = (c1,¬c2, c3, c4, ..., cm, ...),
x3 = (c1, c2,¬c3, c4, ..., cm, ...).
Define µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) by µ(xj) = 1/3 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then µn(cn) = 2/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3},
while µn(cn) = 1 for all n ∈ [4, ...,m], i.e. µ is unanimous in issues 4, ...,m. Now, let γ
7Recall from Footnote 4 that ‘¬’ stands for the logical negation, i.e. ¬0 = 1 and ¬1 = 0.
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be the path (1, 2, 3, . . . , K), and consider x := F γ(µ) ∈ X. By the criticality of c, one
has xn = cn for all n < m and xm 6= cm. Thus, x = F γ(µ) violates unanimity in issue
m.
For the proof of sufficiency of κ(X) ≤ 3, note first that, if κ(X) ≤ `, then a majority
on a particular issue can be overridden only as the entailment of ` − 1 earlier majority
decisions. In particular, this can never happen if κ(X) = 2. If κ(X) = 3, it can happen
only as the entailment of two earlier majority decisions; but in this case, at least one
voter must affirm the entailed decision, so only supermajorities, not unanimities, can be
overridden. The formal details of this argument are provided in the appendix. 2
Note that the possible violations of respect for unanimity when κ(X) > 3 constructed
in the proof of Theorem 2.2 require only three agents and can thus occur quite easily.
Example 2.3 (a) (Aggregation of strict preference orderings) Let N ∈ N, and let XprN be
as in Section 1.5.1 above. In the Appendix we show that
κ(XprN ) = N.
Thus, XprN is robustly unanimity consistent if and only if N ≤ 3.
(b) (Restricted preference domains) Let  be a partial order on [1...N ], and let Xpr be
the set of all linear orders on [1...N ] which extend . Judgement aggregation over Xpr
describes a variant of Arrovian preference aggregation where the voters unanimously agree
with the preferences encoded in , and where the social preference order is also required
(e.g. by the constitution) to agree with the preferences encoded in . For instance, suppose
that all preferences are defined over the Cartesian product M×B where M ⊆ R represents
a set of feasible amounts of public expenditure and B is a (finite) set of social states. More
concretely, say that b0 ∈ B stands for the ‘status quo’ (no public project) and each element
in B \ {b0} corresponds to a different version of a public project. Moreover, assume that
the partial order  expresses monotonicity with respect to the first component in each
social state (‘more money is better’) while refraining from any judgement across states,
i.e. (m, b) (m′, b′) :⇔ [b = b′ and m < m′].
A -antichain is a subset Z ⊆ [1...N ] such that every pair of elements in Z are -
incomparable. Let width() be the largest cardinality of any -antichain. For instance,
in the above example width() = |B|. In the Appendix we prove that
κ(Xpr ) = width(). (5)
Thus, Xpr is robustly unanimity consistent if and only if width() ≤ 3. Moreover, by
equation (5), one obtains a median space in the concrete example if and only if |B| = 2,
i.e. if there is only one version of the public project. In that case majority voting with
a fixed budget amounts to social choice based on the median willingness to pay for the
public project: if total budget is m0 and the public project costs m1 ≤ m0, then the public
project will be realized under majority voting if and only if at least half of the voters prefer
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(m0, b0) to (m0−m1, b1). Moreover, if |B| = 2, the majority view is always feasible, i.e. is a
linear order (that evidently agrees with the preferences encoded in ). Robust unanimity
consistency, however, also prevails if |B| = 3, i.e. if there are two different versions of the
public project.
(c) (Equivalence Relations) Let N ∈ N and consider the spaces XeqN ⊂ {0, 1}K as in
Section 1.5.2. In the Appendix, we show that
κ(XeqN ) = N.
Thus, the spaces XeqN are robustly unanimity consistent if and only if N ≤ 3. An ex-
ample of unanimity violation for N ≥ 4 is the profile considered in Section 1.5.2 above.
Suppose again that each of the equivalence relations corresponding to the three partitions
{{a, b, c}, {d}}, {{a}, {b, c, d}}, and {{a, b}, {c, d}} receives popular support of 1/3, respec-
tively. Then, if issues are decided by sequential majority voting according to any path that
starts with the issues (a, b), (b, c), (c, d), we obtain that all elements of A = {a, b, c, d} are
equivalent. But there is unanimous consent that a and d are not equivalent.
(d) (Committee Selection) Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and let XcomI,J,K be as defined in Section
1.5.3. A fragment c is XcomI,J,K-critical if and only if either (i) |c| = J+1 and c = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
or (ii) |c| = K − I + 1 and c = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Thus,
κ(XcomI,J ;K) = 1 + max{J, K − I}.
For example, suppose K = 4 and J = I = 2; then κ(Xcom2,2;4) = 3, so X
com
2,2;4 is robustly
unanimity consistent. However, if K ≥ 5, then either J ≥ 3 or K − I ≥ 3, so that
κ(XcomI,J ;K) ≥ 4; then XcomI,J ;K is not robustly unanimity consistent.
(e) (Resource Allocation) Let D,M ∈ N, and let X∆M,D be as in Section 1.5.4. Suppose
M ≥ D2 (which is always true if we denominate money in small enough units). In the
Appendix we show that
κ(X∆M,D) = D.
Thus, the spaces X∆M,D are robustly unanimity consistent if and only if D ≤ 3. ♦
3 Designable unanimity consistency
Theorem 2.2 above characterizes the aggregation spaces for which respect for a unanimous
vote is guaranteed no matter which sequence of majority decisions one chooses. As we have
seen, most aggregation spaces cannot guarantee respect for unanimity in this strong sense.
In this section, we thus ask whether it is possible to overcome the problem by design. In
other words, for a given aggregation space, do there exist paths of majority decisions that
guarantee respect for unanimity for all profiles? One might expect a negative answer since
prima facie it is not clear how, by design of the sequence, one could ‘detect’ unanimities
in contrast to mere majorities (in a profile-independent way). However, it turns out that
sometimes this is indeed possible.
Say that an aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1}K is designably unanimity consistent if there
exists a path γ such that, for all µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), F γ(µ) does not violate unanimity on any
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issue. Our first result shows that this weakening of the notion of respect for unanimity
does neither help in the case of committee selection nor in the case of resource allocation.
Theorem 3.1 (a) The spaces XcomI,J ;K as defined in Section 1.5.3 are designably una-
nimity consistent if and only if they are robustly unanimity consistent.
(b) The spaces X∆M,D as defined in Section 1.5.4 are designably unanimity consistent
if and only if D ≤ 3. Thus, again X∆M,D is designably unanimity consistent if and
only if it is robustly unanimity consistent.
Proof of part (a). Evidently, it suffices to show that if there is a unanimity violation for
some profile µ along some path γ, then there is a unanimity violation along every path
η. Thus, let η be given and consider the permutation η ◦ γ−1 : [1...K] → [1...K]. For
each feasible view x ∈ XcomI,J ;K , consider the permuted view η ◦ γ−1(x), and note that
by the symmetry of the spaces XcomI,J ;K , η ◦ γ−1(x) is also feasible. Denote by η ◦ γ−1(µ)
the profile that results from µ by applying the permutation η ◦ γ−1. Evidently, since µ
entails a unanimity violation along γ, η ◦ γ−1(µ) entails a unanimity violation along the
path η. This completes the proof of part (a) of Theorem 3.1.
The proof of part (b) is more involved and is therefore deferred to the Appendix. 2
Given these negative results for XcomI,J ;K and X
∆
M,D it is quite remarkable that we have the
following positive result for the aggregation of linear preference orders, weak preference
orderings, and equivalence relations.
Theorem 3.2 The spaces XprN , X
w.o.
N and X
eq
N are designably unanimity consistent.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is instructive, so we will sketch the main ideas here. Let
X be any of the three spaces in the statement of the theorem, and let [1...N ] be the set
of alternatives. A path ζ on the set of all pairs (a, b) ∈ [1...N ] × [1...N ] with a 6= b such
that (a, b) occurs before (a′, b′) in ζ whenever min{a, b} < min{a′, b′} will be called simply
ordered.8 We will show that, for all µ and all simply ordered paths ζ, the transitive relation
Rζ(µ) generated by sequential majority voting along ζ respects unanimity in all issues.
For any reflexive binary relation R with complement Rc, define two relations R∗ and
R∗∗ as follows. For all a, b ∈ [1...N ],
aR∗b :⇔ [aRb and, for all d, (bRd⇒ aRd) &(dRa⇒ dRb)]
aR∗∗b :⇔ [aRcb and, for all d, (aRd⇒ dRcb)]
The relation R∗ is the so-called ‘covering relation’, well-known in preference aggregation
theory (Miller, 1980).9 Note that R∗ is always transitive, and R∗ is symmetric whenever
8Observe that there is a multitude of different simply ordered paths, not only corresponding to different
orderings of the alternatives but also with respect to a fixed ordering of the alternatives.
9See also Shepsle and Weingast (1984), Banks (1985), McKelvey (1986), Moulin (1986), Cox (1987),
and p.254 of Moulin (1988).
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R is symmetric. Henceforth, we will refer to the fragment defined by the pair [R∗, R∗∗] as
the covering fragment corresponding to the relation R.10
For any profile µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), let [R(µ), Rc(µ)] represent the issue-wise majority relation,
i.e. aR(µ)b if a majority affirms aRb, and aRc(µ)b if a majority rejects aRb. Moreover,
denote by U(µ) the ‘unanimity relation’ corresponding to µ, i.e. aU(µ)b if under µ there
is unanimous agreement that aRb or unanimous agreement that aRcb.
Lemma 1 For all µ, R∗(µ) ⊇ [U(µ) ∩R(µ)] and R∗∗(µ) ⊇ [U(µ) ∩Rc(µ)].
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows from transitivity of R. Suppose that all agents affirm
aRb. Then, if a majority affirms bRd, the same majority must affirm aRd by transitivity;
similarly, if a majority affirms dRa, the same majority also affirms dRb. This shows the
first part of Lemma 1. The second part follows from noting that, if a majority affirms
aRd and another majority affirms dRb, then at least one agent must affirm aRd and dRb,
hence by transitivity also aRb; thus, we could not have unanimous support for aRcb. 2
The following lemma states that the transitive relation that results from sequential majority
voting along the path ζ extends the covering fragment corresponding to the issue-wise
majority relation.
Lemma 2 For all µ, Rζ(µ) ⊇ R∗(µ) and (Rζ)c(µ) ⊇ R∗∗(µ).
The proof of Lemma 2 is more involved and is therefore deferred to the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly imply that Rζ(µ) extends the ‘positive’
unanimity relation corresponding to µ, and (Rζ)c(µ) extends the ‘negative’ unanimity
relation corresponding to µ. The result follows. 2
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 3.2, consider again Example 2.1 and Fig. 1 above. As
is easily verified, the covering fragment of the majority tournament corresponding to the
profile µ is given by {c µ d}.11 In this example, the covering fragment thus corresponds to
the single issue in which there is unanimous consent. If the majority decisions are taken
according to the simply ordered path (a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d), we obtain the
ordering c  d  a  b; on the other hand, the path (b, c), (b, d), (b, a), (c, d), (c, a), (d, a) is
also simply ordered (given a different ordering of the alternatives) and yields a  b  c 
d. Thus, while different admissible paths may give different final outcomes, all resulting
orderings must respect unanimous decisions as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.2; indeed,
they all extend the covering fragment corresponding to the majority tournament, and the
latter does not depend on the decision path.
For the profile µ in Example 2.3(c) above, the covering fragment is given by (
µ∼)∗ = ∅
and (
µ∼)∗∗ = U(µ) = {a 6∼ d}. Consider a bijection pi : {a, b, c, d} → [1...4] and any simply
10Formally, the covering fragment defined by [R∗, R∗∗] is given by the unique fragment w such that
supp (w) = supp (R∗) ∪ supp (R∗∗), w(a,b) = 1 if aR∗b, and w(a,b) = 0 if aR∗∗b (no contradiction here,
since R∗ and R∗∗ are disjoint).
11More precisely, we have R∗(µ) = {(c, d)} and R∗∗(µ) = {(d, c)}.
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ordered path ζ such that the issue (n,m) occurs before (n′,m′) in ζ if min{pi(n), pi(m)} <
min{pi(n′), pi(m′)}, as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. It is easily verified that for the given
profile, one obtains the following sets of equivalence classes as the result of sequential
majority voting along the path ζ: if pi−1(1) = b, then F ζ(µ) = {{a, b, c}, {d}}; if pi−1(1) = c,
then F ζ(µ) = {{a}, {b, c, d}}; and if pi−1(1) ∈ {a, d}, then F ζ(µ) = {{a, b}, {c, d}}. In any
of these cases, the unanimous agreement that a 6∼ d is respected.
Remark In the case of the aggregation of strict preference orderings, the choice rule
among alternatives induced by any path ζ considered in Theorem 3.2 admits the following
simple recursive description. First step: let A1 := [1...N ] be the initial pool of alternatives
and set element a1 := 1 as the initial top alternative. Step `: Compare the current top
alternative a`−1 to all alternatives m > a`−1 in the current pool A`−1. If a`−1 wins against
all such elements, then a`−1 is the final choice; otherwise, let the new top alternative a` be
the smallest majority winner against a`−1 and take A` as the old pool minus the majority
losers against a`−1. Evidently, this procedure yields a final choice after a finite number of
steps, which by Theorem 3.2 cannot be unanimously defeated by another alternative.
For any simply ordered path ζ, the choice rule induced by F ζ(µ) is the same as the one
induced by the corresponding multi-stage elimination tree procedure of Shepsle and Wein-
gast (1984) (cf. Section 9.4 in Moulin (1988)). In contrast to the multi-stage elimination
tree which only produces a winning alternative, however, F ζ yields an entire ordering over
all alternatives. Moreover, to accomplish this, F ζ only needs N(N−1)
2
binary comparisons,
whereas the multi-stage elimination tree involves (2N−1)−1 binary comparisons. In partic-
ular, in the multi-stage elimination procedure, an alternative may face the same opponent
several times; this does not happen along any path ζ.
3.1 A necessary condition for designable unanimity consistency
As demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 2.2, any critical fragment of size greater than
or equal to 4 can trigger violations of unanimity for some path of issues. Yet, as Theorem
3.2 shows, in certain spaces, for certain specially designed paths only critical fragments
of size two or three will be ‘activated.’ But such spaces appear to be rather exceptional;
typically, it will not be possible to ‘sidestep’ all critical fragments of size greater than three
if such fragments exist. In particular, no path can sidestep any exposed critical fragment,
as follows.
Recall that C(X) is the set of all critical fragments for X. Let c ∈ C(X), and let
J := supp (c). For all j ∈ J , let cj be the fragment obtained by negating the jth coordinate
of c. Since c is critical, we know that each cj is contained in some element of X. We will
say that c is an exposed critical fragment if there exists a single ‘complementary’ fragment
d ∈ {0, 1}[1...K]\J such that, for all j ∈ supp (c), the element (cj,d) is in X. Let C∗(X) be
the set of all exposed critical fragments for X. Let κ∗(X) be the size of the largest element
of C∗(X) (with κ∗(X) := 0 if C∗(X) is empty).
Example 3.3 (a) (Preference relations) Let N ∈ N, and let XprN be as in Section 1.5.1
above. For any m ∈ [3 . . . N ], every critical fragment of size m for XprN corresponds to a
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preference cycle of length m. In the appendix, we show that such a critical fragment is
exposed if and only if m = 3. Thus, all elements of C∗(XprN ) have size 3, so κ
∗(XprN ) = 3.
Likewise, let Xp.o.N be the space of all strict partial orders on a set of N elements, as defined
in Section 1.5.5. Then again κ∗(Xp.o.N ) = 3.
(b) (Acyclic relations) Let X be the space of all acyclic, antisymmetric, possibly incomplete
binary relations on a set of N elements, defined similarly to the examples in Section 1.5.5.
For every m ∈ [3 . . . N ], every cyclical relation of length m defines an exposed critical
fragment for X of length m. Thus, C∗(X) contains elements of all lengths up to N , so
κ∗(X) ≥ N .
(c) (Truth-functional aggregation) Observe that any critical fragment of size K is au-
tomatically exposed (with its complementary fragment being the empty word). This
observation yields exposed critical fragments for judgement aggregation problems asso-
ciated with several common truth functions. For example, let X& := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ;
xK = x1 &x2 & · · · &xK−1}, where “&” denotes logical conjunction. Then the sequence
(1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is an exposed critical fragment. Next, let X∨ := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; xK =
x1∨x2∨· · ·∨xK−1}, where “∨” denotes logical disjunction. Then the sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1)
is an exposed critical fragment. Finally, let ⊕ denote the “exclusive OR” operation, and
let X⊕ := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; xK = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xK−1}. If K is even, then the sequence
(1, 1, . . . , 1, 1) is an exposed critical fragment. If K is odd, then the sequence (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0)
is an exposed critical fragment. ♦
Theorem 3.4 If κ∗(X) ≥ 4, then the aggregation space X is not designably unanimity
consistent.
When combined with Example 3.3(b), Theorem 3.4 implies that, for any N ≥ 4, the
space of acyclic relations on N is not designably unanimity consistent. Likewise, Example
3.3(c) shows that several common truth-function aggregation problems are not designably
unanimity consistent.
Clearly, the positive examples in Theorem 3.2 above verify the necessary condition
κ∗(X) ≤ 3 of Theorem 3.4. However, this does not mean that all spaces with κ∗(X) ≤ 3
share the simple structure of the spaces displayed in Theorem 3.2. The following example
of all separable preference orderings shows that there are spaces of transitive relations with
κ∗(X) ≤ 3 in which unanimity violations do occur along simply ordered paths.
Example 3.5 Consider the space X sep of all separable preference orderings on the set
A = {0, 1}3. A preference ordering  on {0, 1}3 is called separable if, for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}3
and all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, [(aj, a−j)  (bj, a−j)] ⇔ [(aj, b−j)  (bj, b−j)]. In the Appendix, we
verify that κ∗(X sep) = 3.12 Nevertheless, unanimity violations do occur along simply
ordered paths. For instance, suppose that one third of the population has the alternative
m1 := (0, 1, 1) on top of their preference ordering, another third of the population the
alternative m2 = (1, 0, 1), and the final third of the population the alternative m3 :=
12A stronger notion of separability frequently used in the literature requires [(aJ , a−J)  (bJ , a−J)] ⇔
[(aJ , b−J)  (bJ , b−J)] for all non-empty subsets of coordinates. One can show that under this stronger
condition, no critical fragment is exposed; thus, in this case, κ∗(X) = 0.
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(1, 1, 0), while all individuals agree that (0, 0, 0)  (1, 1, 1). Such profile is compatible
with separability.13 Consider any simply ordered path that first compares the alternative
(1, 1, 1) with its three neighbors m1,m2,m3. In each case, (1, 1, 1) receives majority support
of 2/3. For instance, if (1, 0, 1) is the top alternative, then (1, 0, 1) is preferred to (0, 0, 1),
hence by separability, (1, 1, 1) is preferred to m1; similarly, if (1, 1, 0) is the top alternative,
then (1, 1, 0) is preferred to (0, 1, 0), hence again by separability, (1, 1, 1) is preferred to
m1. This shows that (1, 1, 1) gets majority support over m1. By an analogous argument,
(1, 1, 1) also receives majority support over m2 and over m3. But if (1, 1, 1)  mj for all
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then separability and transitivity imply (1, 1, 1)  (0, 0, 0), in violation of
unanimity. ♦
Does the fact that Lemma 2 fails on the subspace of all separable preference orderings
mean that this space is not designably unanimity consistent? After all, there could be other,
non simply-ordered paths along which unanimity violations never occur. Can the argument
given in Theorem 3.2 be generalized to demonstrate designable unanimity consistency of
a larger class of spaces? We conclude this section with two conjectures that – without
answering these questions – are meant to shed light on the issue. To formulate them, we
need some additional concepts.
Recall that a critical fragment of X is a minimal forbidden binary sequence. Equiva-
lently, a critical fragment of X is a maximal fragment of {0, 1}K \X, that is: w ∈ {0, 1}J
is a critical fragment of X if, for all x ∈ {0, 1}K , [xJ = w ⇒ x 6∈ X], and no proper
subfragment of w has this property. A collection B ⊆ C(X) of critical fragments is called
a critical basis for X if, for all x ∈ {0, 1}K \X, there exists w ∈ B such that w v x, while
this fails for any proper subfamily of B.
To illustrate, consider again the space of all strict preference orderings XprN . Each
critical fragment of the form
(
1(a,b), 1(b,c), 0(a,c)
)
corresponds to the transitivity requirement
(a  b & b  c)⇒ a  c, and in fact, all critical fragments of length 3 have this form. While
there are also critical fragments of length greater than 3, the family of all critical fragments
of the form
(
1(a,b), 1(b,c), 0(a,c)
)
form a critical basis of XprN . To see this, consider, say, the
critical fragment v =
(
1(a,b), 1(b,c), 1(c,d), 0(a,d)
)
. Evidently, v corresponds to a 4-cycle, hence
to an indirect implication of transitivity. Take any x ∈ {0, 1}K with v v x; since v is a
critical fragment, we have x 6∈ X. To verify that the critical fragments of length 3 form a
critical basis, we have to show that there exists a critical fragment w of length 3 such that
w v x. Indeed, if x(a,c) = 0, then x contains the critical fragment
(
1(a,b), 1(b,c), 0(a,c)
)
, and
if x(a,c) = 1, then x contains the critical fragment
(
1(a,c), 1(c,d), 0(a,d)
)
. This argument can
be straightforwardly extended to cycles of any length.14
Let XrelN ⊆ {0, 1}K be any space of reflexive binary relations on A = [1...N ] with
K = N(N − 1) as in §1.5.5 above, and note that we now include again two separate issues
(a, b) and (b, a) for any two distinct elements a and b. Denote the collection of all critical
13For example, the m1-favouring voters could have the separable preference order (0, 1, 1)  (0, 1, 0) 
(0, 0, 1)  (0, 0, 0)  (1, 1, 1)  (1, 1, 0)  (1, 0, 1)  (1, 0, 0). Permuting the three coordinate yields
separable preference orders for the other two groups.
14The elements of XprN can be represented as complete and acyclic directed graphs on [1...N ]. In the
language of directed graphs, every transitivity requirement corresponds to the absence of a 3-cycles. These
form a basis of XprN , since a complete directed graph is acyclic if (and only it contains no 3-cycle.
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fragments corresponding to transitivity by
Ctrans :=
{(
1(a,b), 1(b,c), 0(a,c)
)
: a, b, c ∈ [1...N ], a 6= c} .
Moreover, say that a critical fragment w ofXrelN is paired if its support supp (w) has the form
{(a, b), (b, a)} for distinct elements a and b. Note that there are only three different types of
paired critical fragments: for all a, b, criticality of the fragment
(
1(a,b), 0(b,a)
)
corresponds to
the symmetry requirement aRb⇒ bRa; similarly, criticality of (1(a,b), 1(b,a)) corresponds to
the asymmetry requirement aRb⇒ bRca; and finally, criticality of (0(a,b), 0(b,a)) corresponds
to the completeness requirement aRcb⇒ bRa.
Definition Say that XrelN is a simple space of transitive relations if X
rel
N has a critical basis
B of the form B = Ctrans ∪ D where D consists only of critical fragments of length two.
Moreover, say that XrelN is a paired simple space of transitive relations if X
rel
N has a critical
basis B of the form B = Ctrans ∪ D where D consists of paired fragments only.
Obviously, every paired simple space is a simple space. The converse does not hold
as Example 3.5 shows. Examples of paired simple spaces of transitive relations are the
set of all weak partial orderings (corresponding to D = ∅), the set of all strict partial
orderings (corresponding to the case in which D consists of all asymmetry requirements of
the form aRb⇒ bRca), the set of all weak orderings (when D consists of all completeness
requirements of the form aRcb ⇒ bRa), the set of all strict preference orderings (when D
consists of all asymmetry and completeness requirements), and the set of all equivalence
relations (when D consists of all symmetry requirements of the form aRb⇒ bRa).
Conjecture 1 All paired simple spaces of transitive relations are designably unanimity
consistent.
Conjecture 2 All simple spaces of transitive relations are designably unanimity consistent.
The envisaged proof strategy of Conjecture 1 is to adapt our proof of Theorem 3.2,
showing via Lemma 2 that unanimity violations cannot occur along simply ordered paths.
However, our present proof of Lemma 2 (provided in the appendix) is not ready-made for
this purpose since in general paired simple spaces the structure of critical fragments is
more complex than in the three exemplary spaces considered in Theorem 3.2.
As Example 3.5 shows, the stronger Conjecture 2 – if correct – requires a different
argument; in particular, one would first have to find an appropriate class of paths along
which unanimity violations cannot occur. The statement of Conjecture 2 seems to be
considerably less likely to be true.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a simple characterization of the class of aggregation spaces
in which sequential majority voting guarantees respect for unanimity, no matter in which
sequence the (majority) decisions are taken (‘robust unanimity consistency’).
We have also investigated the weaker condition that there exists a decision path along
which unanimous judgements are always respected (‘designable unanimity consistency’),
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and provided positive as well as negative examples. The positive examples that we found
are all placed in spaces of transitive binary relations with a particularly simple structure.
Finally, we offered two conjectures about the scope of designable unanimity consistency;
it seems to be a worthwhile problem for future research to settle these conjectures and to
clarify whether there exist further interesting and relevant positive examples.
Appendix: Proofs
Notation A.1. Let J ⊂ [1...K], and let w ∈ {0, 1}J . We define [w] := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ;
w v x}. Thus, w is X-forbidden if and only if X ∩ [w] = ∅. It is sometimes convenient
to express w as an element of {0, 1, ∗}K , where we define wk = ∗ for all k 6∈ J . For
example, suppose J = {i, i + 1, . . . , j} for some i ≤ j ≤ K; then we would write w =
(∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, wi, wi+1, . . . , wj, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
K−j
).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let µ ∈ ∆∗ (X), and let Unan(µ) := {x ∈ {0, 1}K ; x does not
violate µ-unanimity}.
Necessity of κ(X) ≤ 3 for robust unanimity consistency has already been shown in the
main text. In order to demonstrate sufficiency, suppose that all critical fragments have
order 3 or less. If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then Cond (X,µ) = {Maj(µ)} and we’re done, because
Maj(µ) ∈ Unan(µ).
Suppose Maj(µ) 6∈ X, and let y ∈ Cond (X,µ).
Claim 1: Let k ∈ [1...K]. If yk 6= Majk(µ), then µk(Majk(µ)) < 1.
Proof: If yk 6= Majk(µ), then there exist i, j ∈ [1...K]\{k} and some X-critical fragment
c = (ci, cj, ck) < Maj(µ) such that yi = ci and yj = cj, thereby forcing yk 6= ck.
(If there was no such critical fragment, then we could change yk to Majk(µ) without
leaving X —hence y 6∈ Cond (X,µ)).
By contradiction, suppose µk[ck] = 1. Note that µi[ci] >
1
2
and µj[cj] >
1
2
(because
c < Maj(µ)). Thus, µi[¬ci] < 12 and µj[¬cj] < 12 , and of course, µk[¬ck] = 0. But
X \ [c] ⊂ [¬ci]∪ [¬cj]∪ [¬ck]; thus, µ(X \ [c]) ≤ µ[¬ci]+µ[¬cj]+µ[¬ck] < 12 + 12 +0 = 1.
But if µ(X \ [c]) < 1, then µ(X ∩ [c]) > 0, which means [c] ∩ X 6= ∅, contradicting
the fact that c is an X-forbidden fragment.
By contradiction, we must have µk[ck] < 1. 3 Claim 1
The contrapositive of Claim 1 says that yk = Majk(µ) whenever µk(Majk(µ)) = 1;
thus, y ∈ Unan(µ). This holds for all y ∈ Cond (X,µ); hence Cond (X,µ) ⊆ Unan(µ),
as desired. 2
Proof of Example 2.3(a). (This is a special case of the proof of Example 2.3(b) below).
“κ(XprN ) ≤ N”: Any XprN -forbidden fragment corresponds to a ‘preference cycle’ a1 ≺
a2 ≺ · · · ≺ aM ≺ a1 (creating a transitivity violation), for some a1, . . . , aM ∈ [1...N ];
17
such a cycle can have at most N elements. Furthermore, this XprN -forbidden fragment
is critical if it only specifies the ordering between nearest neighbours in the preference
cycle (otherwise it has redundant coordinates which can be removed to obtain a forbidden
subfragment). Thus a XprN -critical fragment requires at most N coordinates.
“κ(XprN ) ≥ N”: Let c be the fragment of order N representing the set of N assertions:
{1 ≺ 2, 2 ≺ 3, 3 ≺ 4, . . ., (N −1) ≺ N , N ≺ 1}. Then c is forbidden (it creates a cycle),
but no subfragment of c is forbidden; hence c is XprN -critical. 2
Notation: For any subset I ⊂ [1...K], we define 1∗I to be the fragment x such that xi := 1
for all i ∈ I and xk := ∗ for all k ∈ [1...K] \ I.
Proof of Example 2.3(b). Let W := width(). We must show that κ(Xpr ) = W .
Recall that K = N(N − 1)/2 and XprN ⊂ {0, 1}K is defined by identifying [1...K] with
some subset of [1...N ]× [1...N ] containing, for all distinct n,m ∈ N, exactly one element
of each pair {(n,m), (m,n)}. By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can suppose that
the partial ordering  is obtained by fixing the values of the coordinates [J+1 . . . K] for
some J ∈ [1...K]. Thus, we can regard Xpr as a subset of {0, 1}J .
“κ(Xpr ) ≥ W” Let A := {a1, . . . , aW} ⊆ [1...N ] be an antichain of cardinality W .
Let I ⊂ [1...J ] be the set of coordinates representing the W pairs {(a1, a2), (a2, a3), ...
(aW−1, aW ), (aW , a1)}. Thus, the fragment 1∗I represents the (cyclical) binary relation
“a1  a2  · · · aN  a1”. Thus, 1∗I is a (Xpr )-forbidden fragment.
Now, for any linear ordering of A, there is some element of Xpr which encodes an
extension of this ordering (because A is an antichain of ). Thus, no subfragment of
1∗I is (X
pr
 )-forbidden; hence 1
∗
I is a (X
pr
 )-critical fragment. Clearly, |1∗I | = W . Thus,
κ(Xpr ) ≥ W .
“κ(Xpr ) ≤ W” (by contradiction) Let v be a (Xpr )-critical fragment, and suppose
|v| > W . Then v must encode a cyclical binary relation “b1
v≺ b2
v≺ · · · v≺ bV
v≺ b1”,
for some subset B := {b1, . . . , bV } ⊂ [1...N ]. Let I ⊂ [1...J ] be the set of V coordinates
representing the V pairs {(b1, b2), (b2, b3), . . . , (bV−1, bV ), (bV , b1)};
Claim 1: v = 1∗I ; hence |v| = V .
Proof: (by contradiction) If supp (v) contained any coordinates not linking two elements
from the set {b1, . . . , bV }, then we could remove this coordinate without destroying the
cycle. Likewise, if supp (v) contained (bn, bm) for any n,m ∈ [1...V ] with m 6≡ n ± 1
(mod V ), then we could remove this coordinate without breaking the cycle. Either
way we would obtain a shorter (Xpr )-forbidden fragment, contradicting the minimality
of v. 3 Claim 1
Now, |B| = V , and Claim 1 implies that V = |v|, while |v| > W by hypothesis. Thus,
|B| > W , so B cannot be a -antichain. Thus, there exist some n,m ∈ [1...V ] such that
bn bm. Clearly, n 6≡ m± 1 (mod V ), because (n, n+ 1) and (n, n− 1) are represented
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by elements of [1...J ] (because they form part of the support of v). If n < m, then we
can remove the elements {bn+1, . . . , bm−1} and get a shorter cycle:
b1
v≺ b2
v≺ · · · v≺ bn  bm
v≺ bm+1
v≺ · · · v≺ bV−1
v≺ bV
v≺ b1.
If n > m, then we can remove the elements {b1, . . . , bm−1} and {bn+1, . . . , bV } and get a
shorter cycle:
bm
v≺ bm+1
v≺ · · · v≺ bn−1
v≺ bn  bm.
Either way, we can construct a smaller (Xpr )-forbidden fragment, which contradicts the
minimality of v. By contradiction, we must have V ≤ W . This argument holds for any
critical fragment v. Thus, κ(Xpr ) ≤ W . 2
Proof of Example 2.3(c). “κ(XeqN ) ≤ N”: Any XeqN -forbidden fragment corresponds to
some ‘broken cycle’ of the form: a1 ∼ a2 ∼ · · · ∼ aM 6∼ a1 (creating a transitivity
violation), for some a1, . . . , aM ∈ [1...N ]; such a broken cycle can have at most N
elements. Furthermore, this XeqN -forbidden fragment is critical only if it specifies only
the (non)equivalences between nearest neighbours in the broken cycle (otherwise it has
redundant coordinates which can be removed to obtain a forbidden subfragment). Thus
an XeqN -critical fragment requires at most N coordinates.
“κ(XeqN ) ≥ N”: let c ∈ XeqN be the fragment of order N representing the set of N
assertions {1 ∼ 2, 2 ∼ 3, 3 ∼ 4, . . ., (N − 1) ∼ N , N 6∼ 1}. Then c is XeqN -forbidden (it
violates transitivity), but no subfragment of c is forbidden; hence c is XeqN -critical. 2
Proof of Example 2.3(e). “κ(X∆M,D) ≤ D”: Let c be a X∆M,D-critical fragment. Suppose
there exist d ∈ [1...D] and n < m ∈ [1...M ] such that c(d,n) = 0 and c(d,m) = 1. Then
we could eliminate all other coordinates from c to obtain a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment
containing only these two coordinates. Thus, if c was X∆M,D-critical, then we must have
c = (c(d,n), c(d,m)); hence |c| = 2.
So, for all d ∈ [1...D] assume that there do not exist any n < m ∈ [1...M ] such that
c(d,n) = 0 and c(d,m) = 1.
Claim 1: For each d ∈ [1...D], supp (c) contains at most one of the coordinates
{(d, 1), (d, 2), . . . , (d,M)}.
Proof: (by contradiction) Let 1 ≤ n < m ≤ M , and suppose (d, n) ∈ supp (c) and
(d,m) ∈ supp (c). If c(d,n) = 1 = c(d,m) then we can remove coordinate c(d,n) and still
have a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment. If c(d,n) = 0 = c(d,m), then we can remove coordinate
c(d,m) and still have a X
∆
M,D-forbidden fragment. Now suppose c(d,n) = 1 and c(d,m) = 0.
If ‖c‖ > M then we can remove c(d,m) and still have a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment. If
‖c‖ < M , then we can remove c(d,n) and still have a X∆M,D-forbidden fragment.
In any case, we can remove a coordinate from c to obtain a smaller X∆M,D-forbidden
fragment; hence c is not X∆M,D-critical. 3 Claim 1
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Claim 1 implies |c| ≤ D. This holds for any X∆M,D-critical fragment, so κ(X∆M,D) ≤ D.
“κ(X∆M,D) ≥ D”: Let m ∈ [1...M ] be the smallest number such that mD > M ,
and consider the fragment c of order D defined by the D assertions {x1 ≥ m,x2 ≥
m, . . . , xD ≥ m}. This fragment is X∆M,D-forbidden because it requires allocating a total
of mD > M ‘dollars’. No subfragment of c is X∆M,D-forbidden, because (D − 1)m =
mD −m≤
(∗)
mD −D = (m − 1)D≤
(†)
M . (Here (∗) is because D ≤ m because D2 ≤ M ,
and (†) is because m is the smallest number with mD > M). Thus, c is critical. Thus,
κ(X∆M,D) ≥ |c| = D. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.1(b). By Example 2.3(e) it suffices to show that the spaces X∆M,D
are not designably unanimity consistent whenever D ≥ 4. Recall from equation (3)
in Section 1.5.4 the way in which X∆M,D is embedded in {0, 1}D×M . Consider any path
γ : [1 . . . DM ]−→[1 . . . D]×[1 . . .M ]. For all d ∈ [1 . . . D], let t(d) := min{t ∈ [1 . . . DM ];
γ(t) = (d,m) for some m ∈ [1, M/3)}. Find d1, d2, d3 ∈ [1 . . . D] such that t(d1) <
t(d2) < t(d3) < t(d) for all other d ∈ [1 . . . D]. For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let xj be the element
of X∆M,D which allocates all M dollars towards claimant dj. (Thus, for all m ∈ [1...M ],
we have xjdj ,m = 1, while x
j
c,m = 0 for all c ∈ [1...D] \ {dj}.) Then let µ ∈ ∆(X∆M,D)
be the profile with µ[xj] = 1
3
for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Observe that Maj(µ) = 0. Furthermore,
observe that µd,m(0) = 1 (unanimity) for all m ∈ [1 . . .M ] and d ∈ [1 . . . D] \ {d1, d2, d3}
(this set is nonempty because D ≥ 4).
By construction, we must have F γ(µ)d1,m1 = F
γ(µ)d2,m2 = F
γ(µ)d3,m3 = 0 for some
m1,m2,m3 ∈ [1, M/3). Thus, F γ(µ) allocates less than M/3 dollars towards each of
claimants d1, d2, d3. Thus, F
γ(µ) must allocate more than 0 dollars towards some other
claimant. That is, F γ(µ)d,m = 1 for some m ∈ [1...M ] and d ∈ [1 . . . D] \ {d1, d2, d3}.
But this violates unanimity in coordinate (d,m). 2
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove this by induction on N , first for equivalence relations.
Evidently, the statement holds if N = 2. By induction, suppose the statement holds for
all sets of alternatives with less than N elements. For notational convenience, we write
aI(µ)b [resp. aI∗(µ)b, aIζ(µ)b] if (aR(µ)b and bR(µ)a) [resp. (aR∗(µ)b and bR∗(µ)a),
(aRζ(µ)b and bRζ(µ)a)]. Along the path ζ, the alternative 1 is first compared with
every other alternative in [2...N ]. Evidently, the two sets E1 := {a ∈ [1...N ] : aI(µ)1}
and N1 := {a ∈ [1...N ] : not (aI(µ)1)} partition the set [1...N ]. By construction, one
has aIζ(µ)1⇔ aI(µ)1, i.e. aIζ(µ)1⇔ a ∈ E1. By transitivity, one therefore has aIζ(µ)b
for all a, b ∈ E1 and not (cIζ(µ)d) for all c ∈ E1 and all d ∈ N1, i.e. E1 is the Rζ(µ)-
equivalence class to which 1 belongs. Note that at this moment, Rζ(µ) is determined
exactly for those issues (a, b) for which a ∈ E1 or b ∈ E1.
Claim 1: The relation Rζ(µ) as determined so far respects the covering fragment,
that is: for all issues (a, b) such that a ∈ E1 or b ∈ E1, aR∗(µ)b ⇒ aRζ(µ)b, and
aR∗∗(µ)b⇒ not (aRζ(µ)b).
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Proof: Let aR∗(µ)b. If a ∈ E1, then 1R(µ)a, and hence 1R(µ)b, i.e. b ∈ E1, which implies
aRζ(µ)b. Similarly, if b ∈ E1 one has bR(µ)1, and hence aR(µ)1, which implies a ∈ E1
and thus again aRζ(µ)b.
Next, let aR∗∗(µ)b. If a ∈ E1, then b 6∈ E1, and hence not (aRζ(µ)b). Similarly, if
b ∈ E1, then a 6∈ E1, and hence again not (aRζ(µ)b). 3 Claim 1
Now consider the set N1 ⊂ [1...N ], and note that the issues (a, b) ∈ N1×N1 are exactly
the issues which are still ‘free,’ i.e. the issues on which Rζ(µ) is not yet determined.
Evidently, the restriction ζ ′ of ζ to N1 × N1 is simply ordered, and Rζ(µ) restricted to
N1×N1 coincides with Rζ′(µ′), i.e. with the equivalence relation on N1 that results from
sequential majority voting applied to the restriction µ′ of µ to N1 along the path ζ ′.
For all a, b ∈ N1, it is clear that aR∗(µ)b ⇒ aR∗(µ′)b and aR∗∗(µ)b ⇒ aR∗∗(µ′)b.
By the induction hypothesis, Rζ
′
(µ′) extends the covering fragment [R∗(µ′), R∗∗(µ′)] on
N1. Thus, R
ζ(µ) extends the restriction to N1 of the covering fragment [R
∗(µ), R∗∗(µ)].
This, together with Claim 1, completes the proof of Lemma 2 for equivalence relations.
Next, consider the case of weak orderings; from this, the case of linear preference
orderings follows as a special case. Again, we prove Lemma 2 by induction on N .
For N = 2 it holds trivially. By induction, assume that Lemma 2 holds for all sets
of alternatives with less than N elements. Consider alternative 1, and define U1 :=
{a ∈ [1...N ] : aP (µ)1}, E1 := {a ∈ [1...N ] : aI(µ)1}, L1 := {a ∈ [1...N ] : 1P (µ)a};
recall that aP (µ)b means [aR(µ)b and not (bR(µ)a)]. Evidently, 1 ∈ E1 (in the case of
linear orderings one has E1 = {1}); moreover, the collection of the non-empty sets from
{U1, E1, L1} forms a partition of [1...N ]. Sequential majority voting along the path ζ
yields aP ζ(µ)1 for all a ∈ U1, aIζ(µ)1 for all a ∈ E1, and 1P ζ(µ)a for all a ∈ L1. Hence,
by transitivity,
(i) aP ζ(µ)b for all (a, b) ∈ U1 × (E1 ∪ L1);
(ii) aP ζ(µ)b for all (a, b) ∈ E1 × L1; and
(iii) aIζ(µ)b for all (a, b) ∈ E1 × E1.
Define Z1 := (U1 × U1) ∪ (L1 × L1) ⊂ [1...N ] × [1...N ], and note that at this moment,
Rζ(µ) is determined exactly for all issues (a, b) ∈ ([1...N ]× [1...N ]) \ Z1.
Claim 2: The relation Rζ(µ) as determined so far respects the covering fragment,
that is: for all issues (a, b) 6∈ Z1, aR∗(µ)b⇒ aRζ(µ)b, and aR∗∗(µ)b⇒ not(aRζ(µ)b).
Proof: Let (a, b) 6∈ Z1. The proof consists of several cases and subcases.
• First suppose aR∗(µ)b. There are two subcases; either a ∈ U1 or a ∈ E1 ∪ L1.
1. If a ∈ U1, then b ∈ E1∪L1 (because (a, b) 6∈ Z1), and hence aRζ(µ)b by observation
(i) above.
2. If a ∈ E1 ∪ L1, then 1R(µ)a, and therefore, since aR∗(µ)b, we also have 1R(µ)b,
i.e. b ∈ E1 ∪ L1. This yields two further subcases.
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(a) If b ∈ E1, then bR(µ)1, and therefore, since aR∗(µ)b, we also have aR(µ)1,
i.e. a ∈ E1, hence aRζ(µ)b by observation (iii) above.
(b) If b ∈ L1 then a ∈ E1 since (a, b) 6∈ Z1, hence aRζ(µ)b by observation (ii).
In any of the three cases considered, we have aRζ(µ)b, as desired.
• Now suppose aR∗∗(µ)b. There are two subcases; either a ∈ E1 ∪ U1 or a ∈ L1.
1. If a ∈ E1 ∪ U1 then aR(µ)1 and therefore, since aR∗∗(µ)b, we deduce that
not(1R(µ)b), i.e. b ∈ U1. Since (a, b) 6∈ Z1, we must thus have a ∈ E1, in which
case bP ζ(µ)a by observation (i). This means that not(aRζ(µ)b).
2. If a ∈ L1 then b ∈ E1 ∪ U1 (because (a, b) 6∈ Z1), in which case again bP ζ(µ)a by
observations (i) and (ii), and hence not(aRζ(µ)b).
In both cases, we conclude that not(aRζ(µ)b), as desired. 3 Claim 2
Now consider the set Z1 = (U1 × U1) ∪ (L1 × L1), and recall that the issues (a, b) ∈ Z1
are exactly the issues which are still ‘free,’ i.e. the issues on which Rζ(µ) is not yet
determined. Evidently, the restrictions ζ ′ of ζ to U1 × U1 and ζ ′′ of ζ to L1 × L1 are
simply ordered. Moreover, Rζ(µ) restricted to U1 × U1 coincides with Rζ′(µ′), i.e. with
the weak ordering on U1 that results from sequential majority voting applied to the
restriction µ′ of µ to U1 along the path ζ ′, and Rζ(µ) restricted to L1×L1 coincides with
Rζ
′′
(µ′′), i.e. with the weak ordering on L1 that results from sequential majority voting
applied to the restriction µ′′ of µ to L1 along the path ζ ′′.
For all a, b ∈ U1, it is easy to see that aR∗(µ)b⇒ aR∗(µ′)b and aR∗∗(µ)b⇒ aR∗∗(µ′)b.
By the induction hypothesis, Rζ
′
(µ′) extends the covering fragment [R∗(µ′), R∗∗(µ′)] on
U1. Thus, R
ζ(µ) extends the restriction to U1 of the covering fragment [R
∗(µ), R∗∗(µ)].
Likewise, for all a, b ∈ L1, we have aR∗(µ)b ⇒ aR∗(µ′′)b and aR∗∗(µ)b ⇒ aR∗∗(µ′′)b.
By the induction hypothesis, Rζ
′′
(µ′′) extends the covering fragment [R∗(µ′′), R∗∗(µ′′)] on
L1. Thus, R
ζ(µ) extends the restriction to L1 of the covering fragment [R
∗(µ), R∗∗(µ)].
This observation, together with Claim 2, completes the proof of Lemma 2 for weak
orderings.
An inspection of the proof of the lemma for weak orderings shows at once that the
result holds also for the case of linear preference orderings. In this case, the argument
simplifies somewhat due to the fact that all indifference classes are singletons, as already
noted. 2
Proof of Example 3.3(a) First suppose that X = XprN . Let c be a critical fragment for
XprN . First suppose |c| = 3. Then c has the form (a  b, b  c, c  a), for some
three alternatives a, b, c ∈ A. The fragment c specifies the (cyclic) preference relations
amongst a, b, and c; a complementary fragment d will specify the preference relations
between all elements of A\{a, b, c}, and also specify the preferences between the elements
of A \ {a, b, c} and those of {a, b, c}. Suppose we construct d to specify the following
preferences:
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• d specfies a specific transitive ordering on A \ {a, b, c}. (For example, if A =
{a, b, c, d, e, f, . . . , z}, then d might specify d  e  f  · · ·  z.)
• d stipulates that a  h, b  h and c  h for all h ∈ A \ {a, b, c}.
Now, define c1 := (a ≺ b, b  c, c  a), c2 := (a  b, b ≺ c, c  a), and c3 := (a 
b, b  c, c ≺ a). Then each of (c1,d), (c2,d) and (c3,d) is an element of XprN . To see this,
note that, (c1,d) corresponds to the preference order b  c  a  d  e  f  · · ·  z,
while (c2,d) corresponds to the preference order c  a  b  d  e  f  · · ·  z, and
(c3,d) corresponds to the preference order a  b  c  d  e  f  · · ·  z.
We conclude that all critical fragments of length 3 are exposed critical fragments for
XprN .
To see the converse, suppose |c| = 4. Then c has the form (a  b, b  c, c  d, d  a),
for some four alternatives a, b, c, d ∈ A. We claim there is no single complementary
fragment d which is compatible with every subfragment of three out of the four coordi-
nates of c. To see this, note that, in addition to specifying relations between elements
of A \ {a, b, c, d}, the fragment d must also specify the relationship between a and c,
and the relationship between b and d. If we negate the last coordinate of c to obtain
c′ := (a  b, b  c, c  d, d ≺ a), then d must stipulate that a  c and b  d (cor-
responding to the transitive ordering a  b  c  d). But if instead, we negate second
coordinate of c to obtain c′′ := (a  b, b ≺ c, c  d, d  a), then d must stipulate that
a ≺ c and b ≺ d (corresponding to the transitive ordering c  d  a  b). Thus, there is
no single complementary fragment d which is compatible with both c′ and c′′. Thus, c
is not exposed. A similar problem occurs if |c| ≥ 5. Thus, all exposed critical fragments
of XprN must have length 3.
The proof that κ∗(Xp.o.N ) = 3 is similar. 2
Proof of Example 3.3(b). Suppose A = {1, 2, . . . , N}. For any m ≤ N , consider the
fragment (1  2, 2  3, . . . , (m−1)  m, m  1). This fragment is obviously forbidden,
since it describes a cyclic order. To see that it is exposed, let d be a complementary
fragment which stipulates that i 6 j and j 6 i for all i ∈ [m+1 . . . N ] and all j ∈
[1 . . . N ], and also i 6 j for all non-adjacent i, j ∈ [1 . . .m]. If c′ is obtained by negating
any single coordinate of c, then (c′,d) is an element of Xp.o.N ; it describes an acyclic
relation where the elements [1 . . .m] are linearly ordered, whereas all other elements of
A remain completely unordered. For example, if we negate the last coordinate of c, we
get c′ = (1  2, 2  3, . . . , (m−1)  m, m 6 1), which corresponds to the partial order
1  2  · · ·  m.
In this way, any cycle of elements in A of any length m defines an exposed critical
fragment of size m. Thus, κ∗(Xp.o.N ) ≥ N . 2
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Proof of Theorem 3.4. Suppose κ∗(X) > 4; we will show that X is not designably
unanimity consistent. Let c ∈ C∗(X) be an exposed critical fragment with |c| ≥ 4.
Without loss of generality (by reordering [1 . . . K] if necessary), suppose supp (c) =
[1 . . . J+1], where 3 ≤ J < K; we will write c = (c1, c2, . . . , cJ+1). By hypothesis, there
exists some “complementary” fragment d = (dJ+2, . . . , dK) ∈ {0, 1}K−J−1 such that, for
all j ∈ [1 . . . J+1], the sequence xj := (c0, c1, . . . , cj−1,¬cj, cj+1, . . . , cJ+1, dJ+2, . . . , dK)
is an element of X.
Now, let ζ be any path through K. The path ζ encounters the elements of [1 . . . J+1]
in some order. Let j∗ be the last element of [1 . . . J+1] encountered by ζ. Now let
µ ∈ ∆∗ (X) be the profile such that µ(xj) = 1/J for all j ∈ [1 . . . J+1] except j∗.
Claim 1: For all k ∈ [J+2 . . . K], we have F ζ(µ)k = dk. For all j ∈ [1 . . . J+1]\{j∗},
we have F ζ(µ)j = cj.
Proof: For all k ∈ [J+2 . . . K], we have µk(dk) = 1 by construction; thus Maj(µ)k = dk.
Likewise for all j ∈ [1 . . . J+1] \ {j∗}, we have µj(cj) = (J − 1)/J > 1/2 (because
J ≥ 3); thus Maj(µ)j = cj
Finally, by hypothesis, the entire fragment (c0, c1, . . ., cj∗−1, ∗, cj∗+1, . . ., cJ+1, dJ+2,
. . ., dK) is not forbidden, because it is contained in x
j∗ , which is an element of X.
Thus F ζ(µ) agrees with Maj(µ) = (c,d) in all coordinates of [1...K] \ {j∗}. 3 Claim 1
The word c is forbidden. Thus, Claim 1 implies that F ζ(µ)j∗ 6= cj∗ . But by construction,
µ[cj∗ ] = 1. Thus, F
ζ must violate unanimity in coordinate j∗.
We can construct such a profile µ for any path ζ. Thus, F is not designably unanimity
consistent. 2
Remark. The proof of Theorem 3.4 seems very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2, but
there is a subtle difference. In the proof of Theorem 2.2, we could specify a path which
moved through all elements of [1 . . . J+1] before moving on to any elements of [J+2 . . . K].
Thus, it was easy to construct a profile which forced this path to violate unanimity. But
in the proof of Theorem 3.4 we don’t have this freedom; the proof must work for any path.
This is why c must be an exposed critical fragment.
Proof of Example 3.5. We show that all exposed critical fragments of X sep have length
equal to 3. Let c be a critical fragment of X sep. First, suppose that |c| = 2; then,
c = (c1, c2) corresponds to a separability restriction of the form [(aj, a−j)  (bj, a−j)]⇔
[(aj, b−j)  (bj, b−j)] for some a, b ∈ {0, 1}3 and some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Say, c1 corre-
sponds to the affirmation of ‘(aj, a−j)  (bj, a−j)’ while c2 corresponds to the negation of
‘(aj, b−j)  (bj, b−j).’ Consider any f−j different from both a−j and b−j (such an f exists
because a, b ∈ {0, 1}3), and the issue (aj, f−j)  (bj, f−j). Any complementary fragment
d ∈ {0, 1}K−2 must either affirm or negate the proposition ‘(aj, f−j)  (bj, f−j),’ hence
one cannot have both (c1,¬c2,d) ∈ X sep and (¬c1, c2,d) ∈ X sep. Thus, c is not exposed.
Next, suppose |c| > 2, and suppose that c is exposed.
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Claim 1: c does not contain any issue of the form (aj, a−j)  (bj, a−j) for some
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof: By contraposition, suppose that, say, c1 corresponds to the issue (aj, a−j) 
(bj, a−j) for some alternatives a, b ∈ {0, 1}3 and some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Consider any f−j 6=
a−j and the issue (aj, f−j)  (bj, f−j); since |c| > 2 and since c is minimally forbidden,
c cannot involve the issue (aj, f−j)  (bj, f−j). Thus, any ‘complementary’ fragment
d must either affirm or negate this issue; by separability, d cannot be compatible with
both c1 and ¬c1. Therefore, c is not exposed. 3 Claim 1
By Claim 1, any exposed critical fragment c must correspond to a direct violation of
transitivity. But we already know from Example 3.3(a) that in this case one must have
|c| = 3. 2
An example of an exposed critical fragment in X sep is the preference cycle (1, 0, 0) 
(0, 1, 0)  (0, 0, 1)  (1, 0, 0). A ‘complementary’ fragment d can be obtained by specifying
a partial order with (1, 1, 1) as the best alternative, (0, 0, 0) as the worst alternative, all
elements of the set A1 := {(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} strictly preferred to all elements of
the set A2 := {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, and in addition some transitive ranking of the
alternatives in A1. As is easily seen, such d is compatible with separability and any
transitive ranking within A2.
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